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"Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui apakah perusahaan tipe-J (agency cost of free cash flow tinggi) akan membuat laporan keuangan yang bersifat lebih konservatif dibandingkan perusahaan tipe non-J. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh efek moderasi hutang (H2), dividen (H3a), stock repurchase (H3b), persistensi perusahaan dalam menahan kas (H4), dan tata kelola perusahaan (H5) dalam mempengaruhi hubungan antara tingkat agency cost of free cash flow dan tingkat konservatisme laporan keuangan perusahaan. Penelitian ini menggunakan dua ukuran konservatisme, yakni konservatisme ukuran akrual dan konservatisme nilai pasar. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat hubungan positif dan signifikan terkait hubungan antara tingkat agency cost of free cash flow dan tingkat konservatisme laporan keuangan perusahaan untuk kedua ukuran konservatisme. Sedangkan kedua ukuran konservatisme menunjukkan bahwa variabel moderasi tidak berpengaruh, yang mengindikasikan bahwa tidak terdapat pengaruh variabel moderasi terhadap hubungan antara tingkat agency cost of free cash flow dan tingkat konservatisme laporan keuangan pada perusahaan.

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The objective of this research is to investigate whether the J-type firm (high agency cost of free cash flow) will have more conservative financial report compared with non J-type firm. Moreover, this research also aim to investigate the effect of debt (H2), dividend (H3a), stock repurchase (H3b), cash persistency (H4), and corporate governance (H5) as moderating variables in the relationship between agency cost of free cash flow and conservative financial report. This research uses two measures of conservatism, accruals and market.

The result shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between agency cost of free cash flow and conservative financial reporting for the two measures. And for the moderating variables, both measures show that there are no effects, which means the moderating variables have no effect in the relationship between agency cost of free cash flow and conservative financial report."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi efek entrenchment dan alignment pemegang saham pengendali akhir terhadap kebijakan dividen kas serta efek moderasi kepemilikan keluarga dan mekanisme corporate governance (CG) terhadap pengaruh entrenchment effect pada kebijakan dividen kas. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa perusahaan dengan pemisahan hak kendali dan hak arus kas yang besar menimbulkan adanya insentif ekspropriasi yang memicu entrenchment effect berupa konflik keagenan yang serius antara pemegang saham pengendali akhir dengan pemegang saham non pengendali sehingga berdampak pada pembagian dividen kas yang rendah. Sampel penelitian ini menggunakan perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI tahun 2006 - 2008. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan kenaikan rasio hak arus kas meningkatkan alignment effect yang mendorong perusahaan membagikan dividen kas yang lebih tinggi. Hasil penelitian juga menunjukkan efek entrenchment effect tidak berpengaruh terhadap kebijakan dividen kas. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan, kepemilikan keluarga memberikan pengaruh yang dapat memperlemah efek negatif entrenchment pada dividen kas, sedangkan mekanisme CG pada perusahaan ternyata belum dapat melindungi pemegang saham non pengendali dari tindakan ekspropriasi."

"Penelitian ini mencoba membuktikan adanya hubungan antara free cash flow dan overinvestment dengan menggunakan sampel sebanyak 208 perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia BEI pada tahun 2013-2015. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa terdapat hubungan positif dan signifikan antara free cash flow dan overinvestment pada perusahaan di Indonesia. Selain itu, penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa beberapa faktor tata kelola dapat mempengaruhi terjadinya overinvestment pada perusahaan. Proporsi Komisaris Independen ditemukan dapat memitigasi terjadinya overinvestment secara umum, sementara jumlah anggota Direksi justru berpotensi menimbulkan overinvestment. Kepemilikan saham Dewan Komisaris dan jumlah anggota Direksi dapat memitigasi terjadinya overinvestment akibat free cash flow, sementara kepemilikan saham Direksi ditemukan dapat memperkuat hubungan antara free cash flow dan overinvestment.

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This research is trying to test the relationship between free cash flow and overinvestment using 208 Indonesian listed firms during the period 2013 2015.The result shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between free cash flow and overinvestment in Indonesian firms. The evidence indicates that certain corporate governance factors are related to overinvestment. I find that the existence of Independent Commissioner can mitigate overinvestment, while the size of the BOD boosts overinvestment in general. The shares ownership of the Commissioners and the size of the BOD can mitigate overinvestment of free cash flow, while the shares ownership of the Directors can boost overinvestment caused by free cash flow."

"Penelitian ini memperlihatkan perilaku asimetris biaya pada biaya penjualan, administrasi dan umum PA&U yang terjadi pada perusahaan manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) periode 2008-2012. Anderson (2003) mengemukakan bahwa perilaku asimetris biaya atau lebih dikenal dengan istilah sticky cost adalah suatu perilaku biaya dalam menanggapi penyesuaian penjualan bersih. Tingkat kenaikan biaya lebih besar ketika terjadi kenaikan penjualan bersih dibandingkan tingkat penurunan biaya yang relatif lebih kecil saat terjadinya penurunan penjualan. Salah satu faktor yang mempengaruhi perilaku asimetris biaya adalah masalah keagenan. Masalah keagenan yang muncul dapat dikurangi dengan adanya tata kelola perusahaan yang baik. Penelitian ini memperlihatkan masalah keagenan yang muncul tidak dapat dikurangi dengan tata kelola perusahaan dalam pengaruhnya terhadap perilaku asimetris pada biaya PA&U.

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This focus of this research is to examine asymetrical cost behavior on selling, general andadministrative cost (SG&A) which is occured in manufacturing companies listed in Jakarta StockExchange period 2008-2012. Anderson (2003) suggest that assymetrical cost behavior, stickycost, is a cost behavior in responding to adjustment net sales. Asymetrical cost behavior occurs when degree of increasing cost is greater as increasing net sales, in contrast with degree of decreasing cost which is less as decreasing sales. One of the factors which influences the asymetrical costbehavior is agency problem. Moreover, the agency problem could be reduced with good corporate governance. This research shows which influens the agency problem cannot reduce by corporate governence in assymetrical cost behaviour in SG&A."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis pengaruh corporate governance terhadap cash holdings dan firm value. Penelitian ini menggunakan uji analisis Fixed Effect Model (FEM). Variabel independen pada penelitian ini adalah ukuran dewan direksi, komisaris independen, dan kepemilikan manajerial, sedangkan variabel dependennya adalah cash holdings yang diproksikan dengan logaritma natural dari total kas pada penutupan akhir tahun dan firm value yang diproksikan dengan perhitungan Tobin's Q. Penelitian ini menggunakan data panel sejumlah 1314 observasi dari sampel perusahaan non keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2007-2012.Hasil peneltian ini menunjukkan bahwa: (1) ukuran dewan direksi memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap cash holdings, (2) komisaris independen dan kepemilikan manajerial tidak memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap cash holdings, (3) ukuran dewan direksi tidak memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap firm value, (4) komisaris independen dan kepemilikan manajerial memiliki pengaruh yang signifikan terhadap firm value.

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The main objective of this research is to analyze the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on cash holdings and firm value. This research is analyze with Fixed Effect Model (FEM). The Independence variables in this research are the board size, board independence, and insider ownership, for the dependent variables are cash holdings that proxied by log of year end total cash and firm value that proxied by Tobin's Q. This study use a panel data sample of 1314 observations listed non financial firms in the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the periode 2007-2012.

The results showed that: (1) board size have significant effect on cash holdings, (2) board independence and insider ownership doesn't have significant effect on cash holdings, (3) board size doesn't have significant effect on firm value, (4) board independence and insider ownership have significant effect on firm value."

"[ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mempelajari pengaruh political connections, corporate governance, dan blockholders ownership terhadap corporate cash holdings sebagai proxy dari agency problem. Penelitian dilakukan menggunakan data panel dari 141 data observasi pada periode 2005, 2008 dan 2011 di Indonesia. Political connections diukur menggunakan variabel dummy. Perusahaan diidentifikasi memiliki political connections apabila terdapat setidaknya satu pemegang saham besar atau top officers yang menjadi anggota parlemen, menteri, atau menjalin hubungan dekat dengan politikus terkemuka atau partai. Corporate governance diukur menggunakan Corporate Governance Index dari Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship. Blockholders ownership diukur menggunakan variabel continuous berupa jumlah kepemilikan saham serta menggunakan variabel dummy yang merupakan pengelompokan untuk kepemilikan blockholders rendah, moderat, dan tinggi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa political connections dan corporate governance terbukti berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap corporate cash holdings. Keberadaan hubungan politis pada perusahaan dapat meminimalkan agency problem karena para politisi yang terlibat dalam perusahaan memanfaatkan jabatan dan kekuatan politiknya untuk keuntungan perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga memperkuat argumen bahwa implementasi corporate governance yang baik dapat meminimalkan agency problem dalam perusahaan. Blockholders ownership tidak terbukti signifikan berpengaruh terhadap corporate cash holdings baik secara linier maupun non linier. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena definisi blockholders yang kurang mencerminkan kepemilikan yang spesifik.

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ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven., The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.]"

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh corporate governance struktur kepemilikan dan struktur modal terhadap agency cost pada perusahaan sektor non keuangan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2008 2012 Corporate governance diproksikan dengan board of commissioner size dan proporsi dewan komisaris Struktur kepemilikan diproksikan dengan kepemilikan manajerial dan kepemilikan institusional Sedangkan struktur modal diproksikan dengan debt to asset ratio Agency cost pada penelitian ini diproksikan dengan asset utilisation ratio Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kuantitatif dengan menggunakan regresi data panel dengan uji analisis Random Effect Model REMHasil penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa secara simultan corporate governance struktur kepemilikan dan struktur modal berpengaruh secara signifikan terhadap agency cost Selanjutnya secara parsial hasil penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa board of commissioner size kepemilikan manajerial kepemilikan institusional dan debt to asset ratio memiliki pengaruh yang negatif signifikan terhadap agency cost Kata Kunci Agency cost corporate governance struktur kepemilikan dan struktur modal.

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This study aims to analyze the effect of corporate governance, ownership structure, and capital structure on agency cost of non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2008-2012. Corporate governance is proxied by board of commissioner size and proportion of independent commissioners. Ownership structure is proxied by managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Whereas, capital structure is proxied by debt-to-asset ratio. In this study, agency cost is measured by asset utilisation ratio. This research is a quantitative research by using panel data regression. This research is analyzed with Random Effect Model (REM).

The result shows that corporate governance, ownership structure, and capital structure simultaneously have significant effect on agency cost. Furthermore, board of commissioner size, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and debt-to-asset ratio significantly affect agency cost and have negative correlation with agency cost."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat pengaruh dari Surplus Free Cash Flow, Corporate Governance, dan Firm Size terhadap Earnings Predictability. Penelitian dilakukan pada perusahaan non-keuangan di Bursa Efek dengan jumlah sampel 72 emiten dari tahun 2006-2015. Model regresi yang digunakan pada penelitian ini adalah regresi data panel. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat hubungan negatif signifikan antara SFCF dan Earnings Predictability. Sementara itu, Corporate Governance mempengaruhi hubungan SFCF dan Earnings Predictability secara parsial, dan Corporate Governance lebih berpengaruh terhadap perusahaan kecil.

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This study has a main objective to analyze the effect of Surplus Free Cash Flow, Corporate Governance, and Firm Size on Earnings Predictability. This study used panel data analysis of 72 non financial firms, listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange for period 2006 2015. From this research, it is found that SFCF has significant negative relationship with Earnings Predictability. The author also finds that Corporate Governance affects the relationship between SFCF and Earnings Predictability partially, in which the Corporate Governance has more significant effect on smaller firms."

"ABSTRAKPenelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat apakah corporate governance berpengaruh terhadap relevansi nilai laba bersih dan arus kas dari kegiatan operasi terhadap return saham. Tingkat kualitas penerapan corporate governance diukur berdasarkan skor yang dikembangkan oleh Mahdan (2010) dengan informasi yang diambil dari laporan corporate governance bank. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan menggunakan model regresi berganda dengan sampel 91 observasi dari bank yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama tahun 2008 sampai dengan 2011.Dari hasil pengujian hipotesis, laba bersih dan arus kas dari kegiatan operasi tidak memiliki pengaruh terhadap return saham. Penerapan corporate governance yang baik oleh bank juga tidak meningkatkan relevansi nilai laba bersih dan arus kas dari kegiatan operasi terhadap return saham.

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Abstract

This research conducted to prove if is there effect of corporate governance in value relevance of net income and cash flow from operations on stock return. Quality of bank?s corporate governance was measured by scores that was developed by Mahdan (2010) with the informations taken from bank?s corporate governance report. Hypothesis was tested using multiple regression linear with samples of 91 bank that are listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2008 to 2011.

This research found that net income and cash flow from operations does not have a value relevance on stock return. The application of good corporate governance on banks also does not increase value relevance of net income and cash flow from operations on stock return."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji bagaimana pengaruh corporate governance Terhadap Cost of Debt Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur di BEI Periode 2006-2010. Corporate governance pada penelitian ini difokuskan pada beberapa karakteristik yaitu Proporsi Komisaris Independen, Kepemilikan Managerial, Kepemilikan Institusional dan Kualitas Komite Audit. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif dengan sampel penelitiannya perusahaan-perusahaan yang termasuk ke dalam sektor manufaktur di Bursa Efek Indonesia periode 2006-2010. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa terdapat Pengaruh signifikan antara proporsi Komisaris Independen, Kepemilkan Managerial dan Kepemilikan Institusional dengan Cost of Debt. Sedangkan Kualitas Komite Audit tidak memiliki pengaruh signifikan terhadap cost of debt.

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This study aims to examine how corporate governance effect Cost of debt on Manufacturing Company in the Stock Exchange Period 2006-2010. Corporate governance in this study focused on several characteristics, specifically are the number of independent commissioners, the number of managerial ownership, institutional ownership and the quality of the audit committee.

This study uses a quantitative approach to the study sample included companies in the manufacturing sector in Indonesia Stock Exchange 2006-2010 period.

The results indicate that there are significant relationship between the proportion of independent commissioners, managerial ownership and institutional ownership with cost of debt. Whereas the quality of the audit committee does not have a significant effect on the cost of debt."