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Abstrak :
Pembuktian dan pemberantasan kartel merupakan salah satu tantangan terbesar yang dihadapi hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia akibat sulitnya upaya untuk membuktikan keberadaan mengingat sifat dasar kartel yang seringkali dilakukan secara diam-diam. Oleh karena itu, timbul model pembuktian menggunakan circumstantial evidence yang dilakukan menggunakan analisis ekonomi dan komunikasi. Meskipun demikian, selama dua dekade terakhir, hanya sepersekian dari kasus kartel yang terjadi dapat dibuktikan. Penelitian ini akan memfokuskan pembahasan terkait kemungkinan penerapan sistem whistleblower protection sebagai pendukung circumstantial evidence sebagai alat bukti dalam pemberantasan kasus kartel di Indonesia. Penelitian ini akan melakukan perbandingan dengan penerapan sistem whistleblower protection yang telah berlaku di Indonesia serta leniency program yang berlaku di Amerika Serikat. Metode penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah pendekatan yuridis-normatif, yang menggunakan data sekunder yang berasal dari studi pustaka dalam menganalisis pokok permasalahan. Hasil dari penelitian ini menunjukan bahwa meskipun memiliki konsep yang serupa, penerapan whistleblower protection system tidak serta merta dapat diaplikasikan ke dalam hukum persaingan usaha dikarenakan keberlakuan whistleblower protection di Indonesia pun belum berlangsung secara maksimal. Penelitian ini memberikan saran kepada Pemerintah untuk mendalami urgensi sistem pengampunan dalam pemberantasan kartel, dengan menyempurnakan aplikasi whistleblower protection system yang berlaku di Indonesia. ......Abolishing cartels is one of the most pressing issues regarding competition law in Indonesia simply due to the fact that there is a difficulty in detecting cartels as it is done quietly between competitors. Due to the pressing issues that occur, a new form of evidence develops which applies economic and communication analysis called circumstantial evidence. In spite of that, during the last two decades, only a few number of cartels have been proven and dealt with by corresponding law enforcers. This research focuses on a possibility of applying the whistleblower protection system in Indonesia as a means to support circumstantial evidence in abolishing cartels. This research will compare the application of Indonesia’s whistleblower protection system with the USA’s leniency program for cartels. The method used in this research is a juridical-normative approach, using secondary data from literature reviews to analyse the subject at hand. The result of this study indicates that even though the whistleblower protection system and the leniency program share similarities and base themselves on a comparable concept, applying one to the other would result poorly, as the whistleblower protection system in Indonesia still has its issues beforehand. This study provides suggestions to the government of Indonesia to increase its awareness on the urgency of an amnesty system on cartel abolishment by perfecting the whistleblower protection system that is applied in Indonesia.

Abstrak :
Penulisan tesis ini merupakan penelitian hukum yuridis normatif dengan menggunakan metode pendekatan perbandingan hukum. Pengalaman negara-negara yang telah mengaplikasikan Program Leniency menunjukkan bahwa Program Leniency bukan hanya berhasil memberantas praktek kartel, tapi juga mencegah praktek baru untuk berkembang. Semakin banyak pelaku kartel yang melaporkan aktivitas kartelnya, sehingga resiko yang dihadapi pelaku kartel lainnya juga semakin besar. Mengingat sulitnya memperoleh informasi karena KPPU tidak memiliki kewenangan untuk melakukan penggeledahan dan penyitaan, Program Leniency adalah salah satu amunisi yang harus dipertimbangkan. Program Leniency dapat memberikan tekanan yang intensif kepada anggota kartel untuk melapor atau memberikan pengakuan. Namun bagaimanapun, kesuksesan memperoleh informasi juga tergantung pada besaran sanksi dan insentif yang diberikan kepada pelaku usaha. Penelitian ini akan menjelaskan mengenai tantangan dan prosedur pembuktian kartel dalam Undang-undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999, perbandingan penerapan Program Leniency di Amerika Serikat, Jepang dan Brazil, serta menjelaskan kemungkinan penerapan Program Leniency dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia. ......This thesis is a normative legal research with emphasis on the use of comparative law. Experience of countries that have applied Leniency Program shows that the Leniency Program is not only successful in combatting cartels, but also preventing new cartel practices to flourish. More and more members are reporting cartel activities, so that the risks faced by other cartel members are also getting bigger. Given the difficulty of obtaining information as the Commission (KPPU) does not have authority to conduct search and seizure, Leniency Program is one effective ammunition that should be considered. Leniency Program can give intense pressure to cartel members to report and give confession. However, success also depends on the size of sanctions and incentives given to businesses. This research will explain the challenges and procedures of proving cartel in accordance with the Competition Law Act No. 5 of 1999, the implementation and comparison of Leniency Program in the United States, Japan and Brazil, and describes the possible implementation of Leniency Program in Indonesia.

Abstrak :
Kartel adalah salah satu praktik anti persaingan yang dapat merugikan perekonomian, pelaku usaha, maupun konsumen. Kesulitan mengungkap praktik kartel di antara pelaku usaha adalah karena sifat kerahasiannya. Hal-hal tersebut menjadi alasan berlakunya leniency program di berbagai negara sebagai salah satu instrumen untuk membuktikan kartel. Penelitian ini akan membahas pengaturan leniency program di berbagai negara yaitu Amerika Serikat, Uni Eropa, Australia, dan Jepang serta penerapannya menurut hukum persaingan usaha Indonesia. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif yang menggunakan analisa kualitatif. Leniency program yang diatur dalam leniency policy di berbagai negara memiliki desain yang berbeda-beda disesuaikan dengan kebutuhan hukum masing-masing negara. Di Indonesia leniency program sempat diatur dalam Perkom No. 4 Tahun 2010 namun ketentuan mengenai leniency tersebut dicabut karena tidak ada landasan hukumnya. Untuk itu perlu dilakukan amandemen terhadap UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 tentang Larangan Praktik Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat sebagai payung hukum berlakunya leniency program sebagai salah satu pilihan instrumen pembuktian kartel di Indonesia.

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Cartel is one of practices to restrict competition from economic loss that could harm entrepreneurs or even consumers. Difficulty in revealing cartel practice among entrepreneurs is due to its confidentiality which gave birth to leniency program enactment in several countries as an instrument to verify cartel. This research will discuss leniency program in several countries, such as United States, European Union, Australia and Japan, as well as its implementation according to competition law in Indonesia. This research is a normative legal research which uses qualitative analysis. In Indonesia, leniency program once regulated in KPPU Regulation Number 4 Year 2010, but it was revoked due to the absence of legal basis. Therefore Law Number 5 Year 1999 needs amendment as the umbrella act of leniency program enactment which acts as one of cartel verification instruments in Indonesia.

Abstrak :
Kartel dipersepsikan sebagai bentuk paling berbahaya dari tindakan anti persaingan dan di beberapa yurisdiksi menerima penanganan dari perspektif hukum pidana. Sifat kerahasiaan kartel menjadi hambatan terbesar bagi otoritas persaingan usaha untuk membuktikan keberadaan kartel, hal mana juga dialami oleh Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha di Indonesia. Untuk alasan ini, sejumlah besar yurisdiksi telah mengadopsi leniency program untuk mengungkapkan keberadaan kartel.Tesis ini membahas pengaturan dan implementasi leniency program dalam Antitrust Law di Amerika Serikat dan Antimonopoly Law di Jepang serta kemungkinan penerapannya dalam hukum persaingan di Indonesia. Penelitian ini adalah penelitian yuridis normatif yang menggunakan metode pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan perbandingan. Hasil penelitian menyarankan untuk menerapkan leniency program melalui amandemen Undang- Undang Nomor 5 Tahun 1999 dan sejalan dengan itu meningkatkan sanksi denda administratif yang diterapkan KPPU terhadap pelaku kartel.

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Cartels are perceived as the most dangerous form of anti-competitive conduct and in some jurisdiction subjected to the criminal penalty regime. The confidential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle in proving their existence, which is also experienced by the Business Competition Supervisory Commission in Indonesia. Leniency programs uncover conspiracies that would otherwise go undetected and for this reasons numerous jurisdictions have adopted leniency program within their competition law regime. The study discussed the regulation of leniency program and its implementation both in the United States Antitrust Law and in Japan Antimonopoly Law. The study also addressed the possibility of leniency program? application in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement leniency program in Indonesia through the amendment of Law No. 5 of 1999 and to increase the administrative fines imposed by the Commission against perpetrators of cartels.

Abstrak :
[ABSTRAK
Dari semua praktik bisnis yang tidak sehat, Kartel dipersepsikan sebagai bentuk paling berbahaya dari tidakan persaingan usaha karena para pelakunya sepakat melakukan konspirasi mengenai hal-hal yang bersifat sangat pokok dalam suatu transaksi bisnis. Kartel akan menyebabkan kerugian bagi konsumen. Sifat kerahasiaan kartel menjadi hambatan terbesar bagi otoritas persaingan usaha untuk membuktikkan eksistensi kartel, Indonesia juga mengalami hal tersebut. Untuk sejumlah alasan tersebut, beberapa negara di Barat menggunakan pendekatan per se illegal. Per se illegal memiliki beberapa keunggulan dibanding rule of reason dalam mengungkap keberadaan kartel. Tesis ini membahas mengenai pengaturan penerapan pendekatan per se illegal dalam Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) di Jepang dan The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) di Korea Selatan serta kemungkinan penerapan pendekatan per se illegal dalam hukum persaingan di Indonesia. Penelitian ini adalah penelitian yuridis normatif yang menggunakan metode pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan perbandingan. Hasil penelitian menyarankan untuk menerapkan ketentuan mengenai pendekatan per se illegal melalui amandemen Undang-undang Nomor 5 tahun 1999 sejalan dengan itu menambahkan kewenangan KPPU terkait penggeledahan.

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ABSTRACT
From of all the unfair business practices, Cartel are perceived as the the most dangerous from of competitive business, because the principals agreed the conspiracy on matters that are staples in a business transaction. Cartel would cause harm to consumers. The confindential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle for the Competition authority?s effort to prove the existence of the cartel, Indonesia also experienced it. From some reasons, numerous jurisdictions have adopted approach of per se illegal. Per se illegal has several advantages compared to a rule of reason in expose the existence of cartel. This study discussed the rule on Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) in Japan and The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) in South Korea also addressed the possibility application Per Se illegal approach in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement provisions concerning Per Se Illegal approach trough amandement Law Number 5 year 1999 and in line with the added KPPU?s authority related search and seizure.;From of all the unfair business practices, Cartel are perceived as the the most dangerous from of competitive business, because the principals agreed the conspiracy on matters that are staples in a business transaction. Cartel would cause harm to consumers. The confindential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle for the Competition authority?s effort to prove the existence of the cartel, Indonesia also experienced it. From some reasons, numerous jurisdictions have adopted approach of per se illegal. Per se illegal has several advantages compared to a rule of reason in expose the existence of cartel. This study discussed the rule on Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) in Japan and The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) in South Korea also addressed the possibility application Per Se illegal approach in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement provisions concerning Per Se Illegal approach trough amandement Law Number 5 year 1999 and in line with the added KPPU?s authority related search and seizure.;From of all the unfair business practices, Cartel are perceived as the the most dangerous from of competitive business, because the principals agreed the conspiracy on matters that are staples in a business transaction. Cartel would cause harm to consumers. The confindential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle for the Competition authority?s effort to prove the existence of the cartel, Indonesia also experienced it. From some reasons, numerous jurisdictions have adopted approach of per se illegal. Per se illegal has several advantages compared to a rule of reason in expose the existence of cartel. This study discussed the rule on Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) in Japan and The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) in South Korea also addressed the possibility application Per Se illegal approach in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement provisions concerning Per Se Illegal approach trough amandement Law Number 5 year 1999 and in line with the added KPPU?s authority related search and seizure.;From of all the unfair business practices, Cartel are perceived as the the most dangerous from of competitive business, because the principals agreed the conspiracy on matters that are staples in a business transaction. Cartel would cause harm to consumers. The confindential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle for the Competition authority?s effort to prove the existence of the cartel, Indonesia also experienced it. From some reasons, numerous jurisdictions have adopted approach of per se illegal. Per se illegal has several advantages compared to a rule of reason in expose the existence of cartel. This study discussed the rule on Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) in Japan and The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) in South Korea also addressed the possibility application Per Se illegal approach in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement provisions concerning Per Se Illegal approach trough amandement Law Number 5 year 1999 and in line with the added KPPU?s authority related search and seizure.;From of all the unfair business practices, Cartel are perceived as the the most dangerous from of competitive business, because the principals agreed the conspiracy on matters that are staples in a business transaction. Cartel would cause harm to consumers. The confindential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle for the Competition authority?s effort to prove the existence of the cartel, Indonesia also experienced it. From some reasons, numerous jurisdictions have adopted approach of per se illegal. Per se illegal has several advantages compared to a rule of reason in expose the existence of cartel. This study discussed the rule on Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) in Japan and The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) in South Korea also addressed the possibility application Per Se illegal approach in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement provisions concerning Per Se Illegal approach trough amandement Law Number 5 year 1999 and in line with the added KPPU?s authority related search and seizure., From of all the unfair business practices, Cartel are perceived as the the most dangerous from of competitive business, because the principals agreed the conspiracy on matters that are staples in a business transaction. Cartel would cause harm to consumers. The confindential nature of cartel has been the biggest obstacle for the Competition authority’s effort to prove the existence of the cartel, Indonesia also experienced it. From some reasons, numerous jurisdictions have adopted approach of per se illegal. Per se illegal has several advantages compared to a rule of reason in expose the existence of cartel. This study discussed the rule on Anti Monopoly Act (AMA) in Japan and The Regulation of Monopolies and Fair Trade Act (FTA) in South Korea also addressed the possibility application Per Se illegal approach in Indonesia. The study used juridical-normative research method which emphasis on the use of statute and comparative approach. The result suggest to implement provisions concerning Per Se Illegal approach trough amandement Law Number 5 year 1999 and in line with the added KPPU’s authority related search and seizure.]

Abstrak :
Praktik kartel dalam persaingan usaha seringkali sulit untuk diungkap keberadaannya, karena pada umumnya kartel dilakukan dengan kerahasiaan tingkat tinggi. Menanggapi hal tersebut, muncul leniency program yang pertama kali digagas oleh Antitrust Division Amerika Serikat sebagai suatu kebijakan pemberian insentif terhadap pelaku kartel yang mengakui keikutsertaannya dalam praktik kartel secara sukarela kepada otoritas persaingan usaha, yang kemudian diikuti oleh banyak yurisdiksi sebagai alat pengungkapan dan pembuktian kartel. Indonesia yang juga telah mengatur ketentuan leniency dalam RUU tentang Larangan Praktik Monopoli UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 menemui sejumlah hambatan dalam proses penerapannya. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normatif yang menggunakan analisa kualitatif mengenai penerapan leniency program di Inggris, Korea selatan, Singapura, dan Australia. Desain pengaturan dan teknis pelaksanaan leniency program pada keempat negara tersebut dijadikan sebagai bahan rujukan terhadap rencana penerapan leniency program di Indonesia dan sekiranya dapat menjadi jalan keluar terhadap hambatan dalam penerapannya di Indonesia. ......Practice of cartels in competition law are difficult to detect, since cartels are generally carried out with high degree of confidentiality. In response, the US Antitrust Division initiated the leniency program as a policy of incentives for cartel actors who acknowledged their participation by voluntary to competition authorities, then it has followed by many jurisdictions as a means of disclosure and proof of cartels. Indonesia which has also regulated the leniency provisions in RUU tentang Larangan Praktik Monopoli UU No. 5 Tahun 1999 encountered a number of obstacles in its implementation process. This study is a normative legal research using qualitative analysis of leniency program implementation in United Kingdom, South Korea, Singapore, and Australia. The regulatory and technical design of leniency program implementation in those countries are used as reference material to the plan of leniency implementation in Indonesia and if it can be a solution to obstacles in its application in Indonesia.

Abstrak :
Pembuktian kartel menjadi tantangan utama bagi otoritas persaingan untuk menemukan perjanjian yang mendasari terbentuknya suatu perilaku kartel. Senjata jitu pembasmi kartel yang telah diakui beberapa negara di dunia yaitu dengan menerapkan kebijakan leniency, salah satunya diterapkan negara Australia dan dikenal dengan kebijakan Immunity. Penerapan pemberian Immunity di Australia dianggap perlu diterapkan di Indonesia dalam upaya penuntasan penyakit kartel. Oleh karenanya penelitian ini bertujuan untuk membahas dan memberikan penjelasan mengenai regulasi kebijakan leniency yang diterapkan di Australia serta mengkaji urgensi penerapan kebijakan leniency tersebut dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia. Bentuk penelitian ini yaitu penelitian yuridis normatif Metode yang digunakan adalah metode kualitatif dan menghasilkan bentuk penelitian deskriptif-analitis dengan menyajikan gambaran objektif mengenai keadaan yang sedang diteliti. Penelitian ini menghasilkan kesimpulan bahwa dalam menerapkan kebijakan imunitas, ACCC menetapkan dua sistem kekebalan yaitu Civil Immunity dan Criminal Immunity dan satu sistem kekebalan alternatif yang dikenal dengan Cooperation Policy. Dalam menerapkan kebijakan tersebut ACCC melibatkan lembaga lain yaitu CDPP untuk menangani pemberian Criminal Immunity. Bahwasannya keberhasilan kebijakan imunitas di Australia perlu dicontoh dan diterapkan oleh Indonesia dengan perumusan kebijakan yang bijak dalam upaya pembasmian kartel. ......Proving a cartel becomes the main challenge for competition to find an agreement that forms a cartel’s behaviour. The main weapon of cartel extermination that has been recognized by several countries in the world is by implementing a leniency policy, one of which is implemented by Australia and is known as the Immunity Policy. The application of Immunity in Australia is considered necessary to be applied in Indonesia as an effort to eradicate cartel disease. Therefore, this study aims to discuss and provide an explanation of the leniency policy that applied in Australia as well to examine the urgency the leniency policy in business competition law in Indonesia. The form of this research is normative juridicial research. The method used is a qualitative method and produces a descriptive-analytical research form by presenting an objective picture of the situation being studied. This study concludes that in implementing the immunity policy, the ACCC establishes two immune systems, namely Civil Immunity and Criminal Immunity and an alternative immune system known as the Cooperation Policy. In implementing the ACCC policy, another institution, namely CDPP, is involved to provide criminal immunity. That the immunity policy in Australia needs to be imitated and implemented by Indonesia with a wise policy formulation in the effort to eradicate cartels.

Abstrak :
Pengadaan barang dan/atau jasa yang diselenggarakan oleh Pemerintah seringkali berkaitan dengan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, yaitu persekongkolan tender. Kegiatan persekongkolan ini memiliki dampak negatif bagi persaingan dalam menciptakan hambatan untuk saling bersaing antar pelaku usaha. Di sisi lain, Australia memiliki kebijakan dalam menghadapi persekongkolan tender yang sudah terbukti secara efektif dapat mengurangi perilaku persekongkolan. Kebijakan tersebut adalah leniency program yang dalam praktiknya disebut sebagai civil immunity dan criminal immunity. Kebijakan ini memberikan imunitas terhadap sanksi maupun pengurangan denda kepada pelaku usaha yang bersedia untuk bekerja sama dengan otoritas persaingan usaha dalam mengungkap praktik kartel, termasuk persekongkolan tender. Terdapat dua pokok permasalahan dalam penelitian ini, yakni perbedaan perspektif Indonesia dan Australia dalam menangani persekongkolan tender dan potensi pelaksanaan leniency program bagi kasus persekongkolan tender di Indonesia. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji larangan persekongkolan tender dalam pengadaan barang dan jasa di bawah hukum persaingan usaha antara Indonesia dan Australia. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian doktrinal yang memaparkan peraturan terkait suatu kategori hukum tertentu secara sistematis, menganalisis hubungan antar peraturan, dan mengidentifikasi potensi dari peraturan tersebut di masa depan. Adapun hasil dari penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa perbedaan perspektif Indonesia dan Australia dalam menanggapi persekongkolan tender dapat dilihat dari ketentuan hukum persaingan usaha Australia yang menggolongkan persekongkolan tender sebagai bagian dari kartel. Persekongkolan tender tidak diatur secara eksplisit dalam satu pasal tersendiri sebagaimana diatur dalam UU Anti Monopoli di Indonesia. Perbedaan perspektif tersebut mengakibatkan implikasi terhadap persekongkolan tender di Australia mendapatkan kebijakan yang sama dengan kartel, salah satunya leniency program. Berdasarkan efektivitas leniency program di Australia, Indonesia memiliki urgensi untuk menerapkan kebijakan tersebut dalam hukum persaingan usaha. Adapun penerapan leniency program di masa depan dapat merujuk pada kebijakan Australia. ......The Government’s procurement of goods and/or services is often related to unfair business competition, namely bid-rigging. This collusion activity has negative impacts on competition by creating barriers for businesses to compete with each other. On the other hand, Australia has a policy that has proven to be effective in reducing bid-rigging. This policy is called the leniency program, known in practice as civil immunity and criminal immunity. This policy provides immunity from sanction and fine reductions to businesses who are willing to cooperate with authorities in exposing cartel conduct, including bid- rigging. There are two main issues in this research, namely the different perspectives between Indonesia and Australia in handling bid-rigging and the potential implementation of the leniency program for bid-rigging cases in Indonesia. This research aims to examine the prohibition of bid-rigging in the procurement of goods and services under competition law between Indonesia and Australia. This research is a doctrinal study that systematically outlines regulations related to a certain legal category, analyzes the relationship between regulations, and identifies the potential of these regulations in the future. The results of this research state that the differences in perspectives between Indonesia and Australia in responding to bid-rigging can be seen in Australia’s competition law which classifies bid- rigging as part of a cartel provision. Bid-rigging is not explicitly regulated in a separate article as stipulated in Indonesia's Anti-Monopoly Law. These differences result in implications for bid-rigging in Australia receiving the same policy as a cartel, including the leniency program. Based on the effectiveness of the leniency program in Australia, Indonesia has the urgency to implement such a policy in competition law. The future implementation of the leniency program may refer to Australia’s policy.

Abstrak :
The literature shows that leniency has negative impact on employee performance and firm productivity. However, there has been limited empirical research of how to mitigate the bias. This study examines if leniency is mitigateable by availability of subjective evaluation criteria and group rater. Using experimental method with sixty-nine undergraduate students as subjects, we find that process within group is effective to reduce individual subjective rating, even when there was no subjective criteria. However, we find group rating does not have effect on rating accuracy. Additionally, consistent with general assumption of leniency, we find that inflated rating is affected by altruistic traits of raters. With the inherent limitations associated with experimental method, our finding suggests that, in order to have subjective rating accurately, firm should promote sound rating process by defining more relevant criteria to complement the evaluation process.

Abstrak Literatur menunjukkan bahwa bias kemurahan hati berdampak negatif terhadap kinerja karyawan dan produktivitas perusahaan. Meskipun demikian, hanya terdapat sedikit penelitian empiris mengenai cara memitigasi bias ini. Penelitian ini menguji apakah bias kemurahan hati dapat dimitigasi melalui ketersediaan kriteria evaluasi subjektif dan penggunaan grup penilai. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan eksperimen yang diikuti oleh 69 mahasiswa S1 sebagai subjek, kami menemukan bahwa proses yang terjadi dalam grup efektif untuk menurunkan penilaian kinerja subjektif yang diberikan secara individual, bahkan ketika tidak tersedia kriteria subjektif. Namun, kami juga menemukan bahwa kriteria subjektif tidak berpengaruh terhadap keakuratan penilaian kinerja. Selain itu, konsisten dengan asumsi umum mengenai bias kemurahan hati, kami menemukan bahwa penilaian kinerja yang ditinggikan dipengaruhi oleh kepribadian altruistis penilai. Dengan berbagai keterbatasan yang melekat pada desain eksperimen, temuan kami menyarankan bahwa untuk menghasilkan penilaian kinerja subjektif yang akurat, perusahaan harus mendorong proses penilaian yang lebih baik melalui penetapan kriteria yang lebih relevan dalam mendukung proses evaluasi kinerja.

Abstrak :

Kartel adalah hal yang berbahaya, terutama di negara-negara berkembang karena kerusakan pada pasar sering diremehkan. Salah satu cara untuk penegakan hukuman bagi kartel adalah penerapan program keringanan hukuman. Dalam studi ini, implementasi program keringanan hukuman di Brasil, Cina, dan India akan dievaluasi, terutama mengenai tantangannya dalam pelaksanaan implementasi yang efektif. Hambatan di setiap negara diidentifikasi dengan menganalisis tiga pilar implementasi program keringanan hukuman yang efektif yang diberikan oleh Scott D. Hammond. Ketiga negara tersebut berhasil dalam memberi ancaman sanksi berat, meskipun masih berkembang dalam dua pilar lainnya yaitu risiko untuk terdeteksi dan transparansi dalam kebijakan penegakan hukum.

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Cartels are harmful, especially in emerging countries because the damages to the market are underestimated. One of the means for cartel enforcement entails the implementation of a leniency program. In this study, the implementation of leniency programs in Brazil, China, and India will be evaluated, specifically its challenges in effective implementation. The obstacles in each country are identified by analyzing three cornerstones of effective leniency program implementation provided by Scott D. Hammond. Those three countries are successful in terms of inducing a threat of severe sanctions, although lacking in the two other cornerstones which are perceived risk of detection and transparency in enforcement policies.