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"Abstrak In recent years, corruption cases at the village level have been in the public spotlight. This was evidenced through around 154 corruption cases at the village level involving 112 village heads, 32 village officials and 3 village heads. This corruption case resulted in the state experiencing a loss of 47.56 billion rupiah during 2015 until 2017. This case is carried out through various modes such as the practice of budget abuse, fictitious reports, fictitious activities/projects, and budget bubbles. These various modes occur because the internal control system is ineffective, so it provides an opportunity for actors to act opportunistically. The goal is to maximize his personal interests as agents rather than the interests of the community as principals. This opportunistic behavior is caused by the existence of information asymmetry. Information asymmetry creates conditions for obtaining information that is not aligned between the village head as an agent and the community as the principal, so that the emergence of adverse selection. This study aims to examine the effect of the internal control system on fraudulent use of village funds in agency conflict conditions through adverse selection. This study used the laboratory experiment method with the subject being Accounting Student at Pattimura University Ambon. The data analysis technique uses Two Way ANOVA with a 2x2 factorial experimental design. The results of the study show that (1) adverse selection conditions affect the relationship between the internal control system and fraudulent use of village funds, (2) the internal control system that does not effectively affect fraudulent use of village funds under adverse selection is compared to no adverse selection (3 ) adverse selection conditions do not affect fraudulent use of village funds when the internal control system is effective, and (4) in the absence of adverse selection, an effective internal control system will reduce fraudulent use of village funds compared to ineffective internal control systems."

"Kehadiran moral hazard dan adverse selection dalam asuransi kesehatan dapat mengubah kebiasaan pencegahan diri pada individu, yang mengarah pada praktik keuangan yang tidak berkelanjutan bagi perusahaan asuransi. Tesis ini meneliti pengeluaran untuk pengobatan mandiri sebagai indikator hadirnya moral hazard dalam kebijakan Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) yang diperkenalkan pada tahun 2014. Menggunakan data panel dua periode dari Indonesia Family Life Survey dan metode difference-in-differences (DID) untuk memperkirakan dampak kausal dari program JKN, studi ini juga menggabungkan propensity score matching (PSM) untuk mengurangi potensi efek adverse selection dalam pendaftaran JKN yang tidak acak. Analisis menunjukkan bahwa hasil awal DID mengindikasikan adanya moral hazard, yang terlihat dari berkurangnya pengeluaran untuk pengobatan mandiri. Namun, analisis PSM-DID tidak mendukung adanya moral hazard, hal ini menunjukkan bahwa temuan awal dipengaruhi oleh adverse selection. Hasil ini memberikan kontribusi pada literatur empiris mengenai tantangan moral hazard dan adverse selection dalam sistem asuransi kesehatan public, khususnya di Indonesia.

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The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection in health insurance can undermine individuals’ self-preventive measures, leading to unsustainable financial practice. This thesis investigates self-medication spending as an indicator of moral hazard within Indonesia’s public health insurance policy (JKN) introduced in 2014. Utilizing two-period panel data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey and employing difference-in-differences (DID) method to estimate causal effect of the JKN program, this study also incorporates propensity score matching (PSM) to mitigate the potential adverse selection effect in non-randomized JKN enrollment. The analysis revealed that initial DID results suggest the presence of moral hazard, evidenced by a crowding out of self-medication spending. However, post-matching DID analysis does not support the existence of moral hazard, indicating that the initial findings were influenced by adverse selection. These results contribute to the empirical literature on the challenges of moral hazard and adverse selection in Indonesia’s public health insurance system."