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I Ketut Sawitra Mustika
Abstrak :
Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menyajikan pembacaan yang berbeda dari interpretasi mainstream yang menyudutkan Schopenhauer: interpretasi yang konsisten. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode pemerolehan pengetahuan melalui pengenalan dan deskripsi. Teori Schopenhauer dianggap tidak konsisten karena menyimpulkan kehendak sebagai thing-in-itself. Kehendak yang diperoleh melalui pengamatan langsung terhadap tubuh merupakan representasi yang masih terselubung forma waktu, sedangkan thing-in-itself sama sekali berbeda dengan representasi yang berada di luar jangkauan ruang, waktu, dan kausalitas (prinsip alasan mencukupi). Oleh karena itu, menyimpulkan kehendak sebagai thing-in-itself inkonsisten. Tetapi interpretasi ini salah karena Schopenhauer tidak pernah mengklaim bahwa pengamatan langsung terhadap tubuh akan menghasilkan pengetahuan tentang thing-in-itself. Sejak awal, dia menyadari bahwa pengetahuan langsung terhadap thing-in-itself mustahil, karena pengetahuan, terlepas dari bentuknya, selalu merupakan pengetahuan tentang tampakan. Dia tahu kehendak sama sekali tidak memenuhi syarat sebagai thing-in-itself. Fungsi sebenarnya dari kehendak dalam metafisika Schopenhauer adalah nama dan konsep yang digunakan untuk memikirkan thing-in-itself secara objektif. Tafsir ini membuat metafisika Schopenhauer konsisten. ......This article aims to present a different reading from the mainstream interpretation that corners Schopenhauer: a consistent interpretation. This research uses the method of acquiring knowledge by acquaintance and description. Schopenhauer’s theory is considered inconsistent because it concludes will as a thing-in-itself. The will, which is obtained through direct observation of the body, is a representation that is still shrouded in the veil of the time form, while thing-in-itself is completely different from representation, which is beyond the reach of space, time, and causality (principle of sufficient reason). Concluding will as a thing-in-itself is therefore inconsistent. But this interpretation is wrong because Schopenhauer never claimed that direct observation of the body would yield knowledge of the thing-in-itself. From the very beginning, he realized that direct knowledge of things-in-itself was impossible, because the knowledge, regardless of its form, was always knowledge of appearances. He knows will do not at all qualify as a thing-in-itself. The true function of the will in Schopenhauer's metaphysics is the name and concept by which one can think about things-in-itself objectively. This interpretation makes Schopenhauer's metaphysics consistent.
Depok: Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya Universitas Indonesia, 2021
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UI - Tesis Membership  Universitas Indonesia Library
cover
I Ketut Sawitra Mustika
Abstrak :
This article aims to present a different reading from the mainstream interpretation that corners Schopenhauer: a consistent interpretation. The authors use a method of acquiring knowledge by acquaintance and description. Schopenhauer’s theory is often considered inconsistent because it concludes will as a thing-in-itself. The will, which is obtained through direct observation of the body, is a representation that is still shrouded in the veil of time form, while thing-in-itself is completely different from representation, and is beyond the reach of space, time, and causality, with reference to principle of sufficient reason. Concluding will as a thing-in-itself is therefore considered inconsistent. However, this interpretation might be wrong because Schopenhauer never claimed that direct observation of the body would yield knowledge of the thing-in-itself. From the very beginning, he realised that direct knowledge of thing-in-itself was impossible, because the knowledge, regardless of its form, was always knowledge of appearances. He knows that will does not qualify as a thing-in-itself. The true function of the will in Schopenhauer's metaphysics lies in the name and concept by which one can think about thing-in-itself objectively.
Bandung: Department of Philosophy, 2021
105 MEL 37:2 (2021)
Artikel Jurnal  Universitas Indonesia Library