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"Koalisi dan oposisi sebagai bagian pemerintahan di Indonesia dapat memiliki hubungan dengan kinerja keuangan. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji secara empiris mengenai peran koalisi dan oposisi politik di pemerintahan yaitu Kota/ Kabupaten. Jumlah sampel yang diambil adalah 429 Kota/ Kabupaten selama 2 tahun (2015-2016). Total observasi adalah 858. Semua sampel dari Indonesia. Pengukuran penelitian menggunakan regresi (panel data). Kinerja Keuangan diukur dari proporsi Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD) dibagi dengan total aset. Koalisi politik diukur dari jumlah anggota koalisi DPRD (berasal dari partai yang sama dengan Bupati/ Walikota) dibagi total anggota DPRD. Oposisi adalah pemenang dari partai kedua (oposisi) dibagi dengan jumlah anggota DPRD. Penelitian ini menggunakan koalisi dan oposisi politik yang ditinjau dari Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD). Data penelitian dari LKPD, KPU, Jariungu dan BPS 2015-2016.Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa koalisi politik tidak berpengaruh terhadap kinerja keuangan. Hal ini dapat diartikan bahwa, DPRD berusaha tetap menjalankan kegiatannya sesuai dengan aturan Undang-Undang. Koalisi DPRD menjalankan kegiatannya sesuai dengan aturan dan tidak hanya mementingkan posisinya di partai saja, hal ini terbukti pada beberapa kota di Indonesia yang tetap memiliki kinerja keuangan yang baik walaupun dikuasai koalisi. Penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa oposisi tidak berpengaruh terhadap kinerja keuangan. Hal ini dapat disebabkan oleh jumlah oposisi yang relatif lebih sedikit dibandingkan jumlah koalisi. Ini menunjukkan bahwa struktur DPRD tidak secara langsung memiliki hubungan dengan kinerja keuangan pemerintah daerah.

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Coalition and opposition as part of government in Indonesia can have a relationship with financial performance. The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the role of coalition and political opposition in government, namely the City/Regency. The number of samples taken was 429 cities/districts for 2 years (2015-2016). Total observations were 858. All samples were from Indonesia. Measurement of research using regression (panel data). Financial Performance is measured by the proportion of Local Own Revenue (PAD) divided by total assets. Political coalitions are measured by the number of DPRD coalition members (from the same party as the Bupati/Walikota) divided by the total DPRD members. The opposition is the winner of the second party (the opposition) divided by the number of DPRD members. This study uses a coalition and political opposition in terms of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). Research data from LKPD, KPU, Jariungu and BPS 2015-2016.

The results showed that political coalition had no effect on financial performance. This can be interpreted that the DPRD is trying to keep running its activities in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The DPRD Coalition carries out its activities according to the rules and not only prioritizes its position in the party, this is evident in several cities in Indonesia that still have good financial performance even though controlled by the coalition. This study also found that opposition had no effect on financial performance. This can be caused by the relatively smaller amount of opposition compared to the number of coalitions. The results of this study indicate that the structure of the DPRD does not directly have a relationship with the financial performance of local governments."

"Are newly established presidential democracies doomed to fail? In support of their positive answer to this question, advocates of parliamentarism point out that these regimes tend to last longer than presidential ones. This book takes a contrary view. It argues that most of the reasons offered for the poor survival record of presidential democracies - that they are prone to deadlocks, offer no incentives for coalition formation, make political parties weak, and fragment decision making - have neither sound theoretical foundations nor any empirical support. In fact, what has made presidential democracies more fragile is that they typically emerged in countries where the military was already strong, which placed democracy of any kind at risk. Therefore, the prospects of new democracies that have established a directly elected president as their head of government may be better than usually considered.Instead of attempting to change the form of government, institutional reformers should thus concentrate on designing a better presidential democrac"