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Sejak tahun 2009 hingga tahun 2018, terdapat 21 Permohonan Pengujian Perppu yang pernah  diajukan ke Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK), namun, tidak ada satupun  yang diuji secara substantif.  Dengan kata lain, selama ini  tidak pernah ada permohonan yang dikabulkan atau ditolak oleh MK. Hal ini boleh jadi disebabkan oleh adanya kewenangan konstitusional yang dimiliki DPR sebagaimana ketentuan Pasal 22 UUD 1945 untuk menyetujui atau tidaknya suatu Perppu menjadi undang-undang. Penelitian ini  adalah penelitian hukum normatif dengan menggunakan tipologi penelitian preskriptif dan menggunakan data sekunder  serta  merujuk peraturan perundang-undangan,  yang mana dari penelitian ini, telah diketahui bahwa pengaturan mengenai pengujian terhadap Perppu baru muncul setelah adanya amandemen terhadap UUD 1945, tepatnya setelah adanya Ketetapan MPR Nomor III/MPR/2000. Menurut Ketetapan MPR tersebut, pengujian Perppu dilakukan oleh Mahkamah Agung (MA). Namun  sejak tahun 2000 hingga tahun 2009, setelah MK terbentuk, baik MK maupun MA belum pernah melakukan pengujian terhadap Perppu. Baru sejak  tahun 2009, MK mulai melakukan pengujian terhadap Perppu dan menghasilkan  Putusan MK Nomor 138/PUU-VII/2009 putusan mana selanjutnya menjadi “pintu masuk” untuk melakukan pengujian-pengujian  Perppu berikutnya meskipun sesungguhnya hanya akan sia-sia jika DPR ternyata menentukan sebaliknya. Jika bangsa ini sungguh-sungguh menghendaki MK memiliki kewenangan untuk menguji Perppu, maka kewenangan konstitusional yang dimiliki DPR tersebut  mau tidak mau harus dihapuskan. Selanjutnya, untuk meneguhkan adanya kewenangan MK tersebut, tentunya harus diberikan berdasarkan UUD.

 

Kata Kunci:

Judicial Review Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang; Mahkamah Konstitusi; Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 138/PUU-VII/2009.

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Since 2009 until 2018, there are 21 applications for testing the Perppu that have been submitted to the Constitutional Court (MK), however, none of them have been substantively tested. In other words, so far there has never been a request that was granted or rejected by the Constitutional Court. This may be due to the existence of constitutional authority owned by the DPR as stipulated in Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution to approve or not a Perppu to become a law. This research is a normative legal research using prescriptive research typology and using secondary data and referring to laws and regulations, which from this research, it is known that the regulation regarding the reviewing of Perppu only appeared after the amendments to the UUD 1945, precisely after the MPR Decree Number III / MPR / 2000. According to the MPR Decree, the Perppu review was conducted by the Supreme Court (MA). However, from 2000 to 2009, after the Constitutional Court was formed, both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have never reviewed Perppu. It was only since 2009 that the Constitutional Court began to reviewing  Perppu and resulted in the verdict of The Constitutional Court Number 138 / PUU-VII / 2009 which subsequently became the "entrance" to conduct subsequent Perppu reveiew even though it would only be in vain if the DPR turned out to determine otherwise. If this nation truly wants the Constitutional Court to have the authority to review Perppu, then the constitutional authority possessed by the DPR must inevitably be eliminated. Furthermore, to confirm the existence of the Constitutional Court's authority, of course it must be given based on the Constitution.

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"The founding of a constitutional court is often an indication of a chosen path of constitutionalism and democracy. It is no coincidence that most of the constitutional courts in East and Southeast Asia were established at the same time as the transition of the countries concerned from authoritarianism to liberal constitutional democracy. This book is the first to provide systematic narratives and analysis of Asian experiences of constitutional courts and related developments, and to introduce comparative, historical and theoretical perspectives on these experiences, as well as debates on the relevant issues in countries that do not as yet have constitutional courts. This volume makes a significant contribution to the systematic and comparative study of constitutional courts, constitutional adjudication and constitutional developments in East and Southeast Asia and beyond."

"Constitutional Court has authority to judge at the first and final level that decision is final functioning, among other, to review Law against Constitution Final decision of the court, as intended in Article 24C of 1945 Constitution of Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, does not open opportunity for appeal, cassation or other legal efforts."

"The power of national and transnational constitutional courts to issue binding rulings in interpreting the constitution or an international treaty has been endlessly discussed. What does it mean for democratic governance that non-elected judges influence politics and policies? The authors of Judicial Power - legal scholars, political scientists, and judges - take a fresh look at this problem. To date, research has concentrated on the legitimacy, or the effectiveness, or specific decision-making methods of constitutional courts. By contrast, the authors here explore the relationship among these three factors. This book presents the hypothesis that judicial review allows for a method of reflecting on social integration that differs from political methods, and, precisely because of the difference between judicial and political decision-making, strengthens democratic governance. This hypothesis is tested in case studies on the role of constitutional courts in political transformations, on the methods of these courts, and on transnational judicial interactions."

"ABSTRAKOne of the duties of the Indonesian Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi - MK) is to determine whether legislation is consistent with the Constitution. If the MK determines that a statute is inconsistent with the Constitution, it declares that such statute is invalid. In such instance, the MK has the final word to determine the validity of legislation. In the view of some scholars, this feature reflects that the MK adopts strong form of judicial review. While this assertion holds true in some cases, it does not necessarily reflect the complete feature of the MKs approach in deciding cases. In some economic and social rights cases, the MK decision adopts weak form of judicial review. This paper attempts to explain that while constitutionally the MK adopts strong form of judicial review, in some economic and social rights cases it adopts weak form of judicial review."

"ABSTRAKTesis ini membahas tentang kewenangan Mahkamah Agung terkait putusan pengujian yang membatalkan Peraturan DPD Nomor 1 Tahun 2016 dan Nomor 1 Tahun 2017 tentang Tata Tertib serta dilakukannya pemanduan sumpah atau janji terhadap pimpinan DPD yang terpilih pada tahun 2017 yang masih menjadi perdebatan. Penelitian ini mengangkat dua permasalahan utama. Pertama, kewenangan MA dalam pengujian terhadap Peraturan Tata Tertib DPD. Kedua, konsekuensi hukum putusan pengujian peraturan tata tertib DPD terhadap kewenangan pemanduan pengucapan sumpah atau janji pimpinan DPD tahun 2017 oleh MA. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah yuridis normatif melalui studi kepustakaan dan pendekatan sejarah historical approach . Hasil penelitian ini menunjukan bahwaMAdalam melakukan pengujian terhadap peraturan tata tertib DPD adalah menjalankan fungsi peradilan yudisial dalam kewenangannya menguji peraturan perundang-undangan dibawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang. Sedangkan, MA dalam melakukan pemanduan sumpah/janji pimpinan DPD adalah menjalankan fungsi administratif non-yudisial dalam kewenangan lain yang ditentukan oleh Undang-Undang Nomor 17 Tahun 2014 tentang MPR,DPR,DPD dan DPRD juncto Undang-Undang Nomor 14 Tahun 1985 tentang Mahkamah Agung.Secara formal, DPD telah menjalankan putusan MA, tetapi tidak secara substantif. Karena faktanya pemilihan pimpinan DPD yang baru tidak didasarkan pada putusan MA.Ketentuan dalam Pasal 8 ayat 2 Perma No.1 Tahun 2011 tentang Hak Uji Materiil yang memberikan jangka waktu selama 90 hari terhadap kekuataan hukum peraturan perundang-undangan yang dibatalkan menjadi salah satu alasan yang menempatkan MA dalam posisi yang dilematis. Di satu sisi, MA telah membatalkan peraturan tata tertib DPD, di sisi lain MA harus melaksanakan tugasnya untuk memandu sumpah/janji sebagaimana yang diamanatkan undang-undang, MA juga tidak memiliki kapasitas untuk menilai keabsahan dari pemilihan pimpinan tersebut.

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ABSTRACT This thesis discusses about the authority of the Supreme Court regarding the current decisions of judicial review ofthe rules of procedure of DPD Number 1 of 2016 and Number 1 of 2017 as well as guidance of oath or pledge against elected DPD leaders in 2017 which is still a debate. This study raises two main issues. First, the authority of the Supreme Court in the judicial review of the Rules of Procedure of DPD. Secondly, the legal consequences on the authority of scouting oath or promise of DPD leadership in 2017 by MA. This research is using normative juridical method through literature study and historical approach. The results of this study shows that the supreme court in judicial review of law regulation under law against the 1945 Constitution ofthe Republic of Indonesia is implementing judicial functions. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in conducting the oath of DPD pledge is implementing administrative functions non judicial in other authorities as determined by Law Number 17 of 2014 concerning MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD juncto Law Number 14 of 1985 regarding Supreme Court. Formally, the DPD has implemented the Supreme Court 39 s decision, but not substantively. Due to the fact that the election of the new DPD leadership was not based on the Supreme Court 39 s Decision. The provisions in Article 8 paragraph 2 of No.1 of 2011 on the Material Test Rights which give a period of 90 days to the legal power of legislation is one of the reasons that put the MA in a dilemmatic position. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has annulment the DPD rules of procedures, the Supreme Court must carry out its duties to guide the oath pledge mandated by the law, the Supreme Court also does not have the capacity to assess the validity of the election of the leader. Keywords The Supreme Court rsquo s Authority, Judicial Review, Swearing Oath, DPD."

"The present volume studies international judicial lawmaking. It observes that in a number of fields of international law, judicial institutions have become significant actors and shape the law through adjudication. "