Hasil Pencarian  ::  Simpan CSV :: Kembali

"Penelitian ini membahas pengaruh kinerja tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan terhadap asimetri informasi di pasar saham pada perusahaan-perusahaan yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2009-2011. Penelitian ini menganalisis dampak perbedaan tingkat kepemilikan institusional terhadap hubungan antara kinerja tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan dan asimetri informasi. Sampel berjumlah 60 perusahaan yang diambil berdasarkan kriteria seleksi awal perhitungan Indeks SRI-KEHATI. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kinerja tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan berpengaruh negatif terhadap asimetri informasi dan tingkat kepemilikan institusional memperlemah hubungan negatif antara kinerja tanggung jawab sosial perusahaan dan asimetri informasi.

---

This research discusses the influence of corporate social responsibility performance on stock market information asymmetry for listed firms in Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2009-2011. This research analyzes the effect of difference in institutional ownership level on the relation between corporate social responsibility performance and information asymmetry. Sample of 60 firms taken based on initial selection criteria for calculation of SRI-KEHATI Index. The result shows that corporate social responsibility performance has negative influence on information asymmetry and level of institutional ownership weakens negative relation between corporate social responsibility performance and information asymmetry."

"Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui : hubungan komisaris independen, kepemilikan institusional, dan kepemilikan asing terhadap pengungkapan informasi lingkungan hidup dan menggunakan variabel kontrol yaitu total aset, profitabilitas dan leverage terhadappengungkapan informasi tentang lingkungan hidup. Sampel penelitian adalah 166 perusahaan yang terdaftar di BEI dari tahun 2009 sampai dengan 2011. Analisa regresi berganda digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis dalam penelitian ini. Penelitian iniHasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa komisaris independen dan total aset berpengaruh terhadap pengungkapan lingkungan, namun kepemilikan institusional, kepemilikan asing, profitabilitas dan leverage tidak berpengaruh signifikan.

---

The Objective of this study is to examine : The relationship between board independence, institutional ownership, foreign ownership on environmental disclosure and use control variable are total asset, profitability and leverage on environmental disclosure. The sample of this study consist of 166 company which listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011. Multiple regression analysis is used to test the hypothesis in this research. The result of this study shows that board of independence and total asset has significant influence towards environmental disclosure, but institutional ownership, foreign ownership , profitability and leverage has no significant influence."

"Era globalisasai diartikan sebagai masa kebebasan bagi perdagangan dan menanamkan modal serta mengambil manfaat darinya secara bebas ke beberapa negara lain. Tahun 2003 kita kenal juga sebagai awal tahun AFTA yaitu awal perdagangan bebas khusus untuk wilayah Asia. Dengan demikian negara yang tergabung dalam AFTA harus berbenah diri dan bersiap menghadapi persaingan yang semakin keras ini. Jika tidak, negara bersangkutan akan ketinggalan dan tidak bisa mengikuti perkembangan perdagangan dunia. Konsekwensi dari kebebasan perdagangan ini, membawa para pengusaha untuk serius membenahi perusahaannya mengikuti ketentuan dalam perdagangan dunia. Sebab jika tidak, investor tidak akan bersedia menanamkan modalnya jika perusahaan tidak mengikuti ketentuan yang diberlakukan; yang dikenal sebagai etika berbisnis. Salah satu yang menjadi perhatian utama para investor adalah syarat good corporate governance, baik dalam kinerja finansial maupun menggabungkan potensi perusahaan, khususnya bagi negaranegara yang pasarnya berkembang. Investor cenderung menghindari pasar-pasar yang buruk atau rendah corporate governancenya. Hal ini menjadi salah satu sebab perlunya sosialisasi good corporate governance."

"[ABSTRAK Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mempelajari pengaruh political connections, corporate governance, dan blockholders ownership terhadap corporate cash holdings sebagai proxy dari agency problem. Penelitian dilakukan menggunakan data panel dari 141 data observasi pada periode 2005, 2008 dan 2011 di Indonesia. Political connections diukur menggunakan variabel dummy. Perusahaan diidentifikasi memiliki political connections apabila terdapat setidaknya satu pemegang saham besar atau top officers yang menjadi anggota parlemen, menteri, atau menjalin hubungan dekat dengan politikus terkemuka atau partai. Corporate governance diukur menggunakan Corporate Governance Index dari Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship. Blockholders ownership diukur menggunakan variabel continuous berupa jumlah kepemilikan saham serta menggunakan variabel dummy yang merupakan pengelompokan untuk kepemilikan blockholders rendah, moderat, dan tinggi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa political connections dan corporate governance terbukti berpengaruh negatif signifikan terhadap corporate cash holdings. Keberadaan hubungan politis pada perusahaan dapat meminimalkan agency problem karena para politisi yang terlibat dalam perusahaan memanfaatkan jabatan dan kekuatan politiknya untuk keuntungan perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga memperkuat argumen bahwa implementasi corporate governance yang baik dapat meminimalkan agency problem dalam perusahaan. Blockholders ownership tidak terbukti signifikan berpengaruh terhadap corporate cash holdings baik secara linier maupun non linier. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena definisi blockholders yang kurang mencerminkan kepemilikan yang spesifik.

---

ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm?s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm?s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm?s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.;The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven., The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of political connections,corporate governance, and blockholders ownership on corporate cash holdings asa proxy of agency problems. The study was conducted using panel data from 141firm year observation during 2005, 2008 and 2011 in Indonesia. Politicalconnections are measured by using dummy variables. A company identified aspolitically connected firm if there is at least one large shareholder or top officerswho are members of parliament, ministers, or a particularly close relationshipwith known politicians or parties. Corporate governance is measured usingCorporate Governance Index. Blockholders ownership is measured by using acontinuous variable (percentage of shares owned) and dummy variables (groupingof low, moderate, and high ownership). The results show that politicalconnections and corporate governance have significant negative effect oncorporate cash holdings. The existence of political relations in the company canminimize firm’s agency problems because the politicians involved in the companyabusing their political power for firm’s advantage. This study also reinforcesargument that the implementation of good corporate governance can minimizefirm’s agency problems. The impact of blockholders ownership on corporate cashholdings both linear and non linear is not significantly proven.]"

"Tujuan penelitian ini untuk menguji pengaruh corporate governance (dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, dan komite audit) dan pengungkapan sukarela terhadap asimetri infonnasi. Proksi untuk asimetri informasi adalah perubahan spread (selisih spread antara periode announcement dan non announcement). Penelitian ini menggunakan 75 sampel, dengan kriteria telah menerbitkan laporan tahunan dan tersedia tanggal publikasi. Penelitian ini menggunakan indeks corporate governance (dewan direksi, dewan komisaris, dan komite audit) yang dikembangkan oleh Rahadian dan Siregar, (2007) dan Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, dan Lu (2008). Sedangkan indeks pengungkapan sukarela menggunakan instrumen yang dikembangkan oleh Chau dan Gray (2002). Penelitian ini menggunakan analisis regresi berganda untuk menguji pengaruh corporate governance (dewan direksi, dcwan komisaris. dan komite audit) dan pengungkapan sukarela terhadap asimetri informasi. Penelitian ini menemukan : (1) dewan direksi dan komite audit mempunyai pengaruh negatif dan signifikan terhadap perubahan spread. Hasil ini konsisten dengan hipotesis yang berarti keduanya mempunyai peranan penting dan efektif untuk menurunkan perubahan spread; (2) berkebalikan dengan harapan, dewan direksi mempunyai pengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap perubahan spread. Hasil ini mengindikasikan bahwa fungsi dewan komisaris relatif masih kurang efektif; (3) konsisten dengan hipotesis, pengungkapan sukarela mempunyai pengaruh negatif dan signifikan. Hasil ini menyatakan bahwa semakin tinggi pengungkapan sukarela maka akan semakin rendah teljadinya perubahan spread.

---

The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of corporate governance (board of director, board of commissioner, and audit committee) and voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. Proxy for infonnation asymmetry is change spread (difference between spread announcement period and non announcement period). This research uses 75 samples, which released annual report and available released date. This research uses corporate governance index (board of director, board of commissioner, and audit committee) which depeloyed by Rahadian dan Siregar (2007) and Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, and Lu (2008). Meanwhile voluntary disclosure index uses instrument which developed by Ohau and Gray (2002). This research uses multiple regression analysis to examine the effect of corporate governance (board of director, board of commissioner, and audit committee) and voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. This research finds : (1) board of director and audit committee have negative and signillcant effect on change spread. This result is consistent with hypothesis which means both of them have important and effective role to decrease change spread; (2 ) in contrary with expectation, board of commissioner has positif and significant effect on change spread.Jhis result indicates that the function of board of commissioner relatively still ineffective; (3) consistent with hypothesis, voluntary disclosure has negative and signifiGant effect on change spread. This result suggested that high voluntary disclosure will lower change spread."