Artikel Jurnal :: Kembali

Artikel Jurnal :: Kembali

A regulator's dilemma and two‐level games: Japan in the politics of international banking regulation

Tamura, Kentaro; (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 2003)

 Abstrak

Employing a two‐level‐game framework, this paper examines Japanese participation in the negotiation process leading up to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord. The argument made here is that the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) simultaneously pursued different international and domestic goals; moreover, the ministry assessed the outcomes of these negotiations as successful at the time. On the one hand, the ministry's international goal was to preserve the international competitiveness of Japanese banks. To this end, the MoF won a concession from its foreign counterparts. On the other hand, its domestic goal was to introduce statutory capital adequacy rules, which the ministry had been unable to put in place owing to opposition from banks. This study marks a departure from existing accounts that (1) treat Japan as a unified front merely seeking to gain an international competitive advantage for Japanese banks; and/or (2) emphasize market pressure as a driving force behind participation in an international regulatory regime.

 Kata Kunci

 Metadata

Jenis Koleksi : Artikel Jurnal
No. Panggil : SSJJ 6:2 (2003)
Entri utama-Nama orang :
Subjek :
Penerbitan : Oxford: Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 2003
Sumber Pengatalogan : LibUI eng rda
ISSN : 13691465
Majalah/Jurnal : Social Science Japan Journal
Volume : Vol. 6, No. 2, October 2003: Hal. 221-240
Tipe Konten : text
Tipe Media : unmediated
Tipe Carrier : volume
Akses Elektronik : https://academic.oup.com/ssjj/article/6/2/221/1639530
Institusi Pemilik : Universitas Indonesia
Lokasi : Perpustakaan UI, Lantai 4 R. Koleksi Jurnal
  • Ketersediaan
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No. Panggil No. Barkod Ketersediaan
SSJJ 6:2 (2003) 08-25-90194489 TERSEDIA
Ulasan:
Tidak ada ulasan pada koleksi ini: 9999920567527
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